Plato: Apology

 

Apology

In Plato’s account of Socrates’ last stand, in front of his judges and accusers, the aforementioned put to rest accusations of sophistry by stating that he was only a truthteller that was willing to be candid and ask real questions about people’s unexamined beliefs. “To be sure, it will not be prettily tricked out in elegant speeches like theirs, words and phrases all nicely arranged. On the contrary, you will hear me speak naturally in the words which happen to occur to me.”

These accusations were partly based on the belief that by inquiring in the Socratic way, it was a means of “making the weaker argument stronger,” when it was always his intention to build a stronger foundation. Socrates felt that this kind of slander worked because accusers in their youth had parents who “lodged their accusations quite by default,” and those accusations could be believed when there was “no one appearing in defense.” The difficulty in dealing with word-of-mouth slander for Socrates was “that one cannot even know or tell their names—unless perhaps in the case of a comic poet [Aristophanes]. But those who use malicious slander to persuade you, and those who, themselves persuaded, persuade others—all these are most difficult to deal with. For it is impossible to bring any one of them forward as a witness and cross-examine him. I must rather, as it were, fight with shadows in making my defense, and question where no one answers.” Because of a habitual judgment, the word-of-mouth slander simply supported what was generally believed in Athens about Socrates.

He denied his portrayal in comic poetry that he received a fee. How Socrates was different was because he looked for logical answers for things which cleared up illusions that many people required for their social position and what supported their worldview as to what a good life was. Truthtellers are uncomfortable to listen to for that reason. He argued that the resentment he felt emanating from Athenians was created by Chaerephon who asked the Oracle at Delphi who was the wisest, and famously the response was Socrates because “I am wiser than that man. Probably neither of us knows anything worthwhile; but he thinks he does and does not, and I do not and do not think I do. So it seems at any rate that I am wiser in this one small respect: I do not think I know what I do not…Nevertheless, I went on, perceiving with grief and fear that I was becoming hated, but still, it seemed necessary to put the God first—so I had to go on, examining what the oracle meant by testing everyone with a reputation for knowledge. And by the Dog, Gentlemen—I must tell you the truth—I swear that I had some such experience as this: it seemed to me, as I carried on inquiry in behalf of the God, that those most highly esteemed for wisdom fell little short of being most deficient, and that others reputedly inferior were men of more discernment.”

By testing the Oracle’s assertion, Socrates questioned politicians, poets, and artisans, and truth be told they had wisdom in their specialties, yet they all failed the test to examine their beliefs, especially in those most vulnerable areas where they were not specialists. “From this examination, Gentlemen of Athens, much enmity has risen against me, of a sort most harsh and heavy to endure, so that many slanders have arisen, and the name is put abroad that I am ‘wise.’ For on each occasion those present think I am wise in the things in which I test others. But very likely, Gentlemen, it is really the God who is wise, and by his oracle he means to say that ‘human nature is a thing of little worth, or none.’ It appears that he does not mean this fellow Socrates, but uses my name to offer an example, as if he were saying that ‘he among you, Gentlemen, is wisest who, like Socrates, realizes that he is truly worth nothing in respect to wisdom.’ That is why I still go about even now on behalf of the God, searching and inquiring among both citizens and strangers, should I think some one of them is wise; and when it seems he is not, I help the God and prove it. Due to this pursuit, I have no leisure worth mentioning either for the affairs of the City or for my own estate; I dwell in utter poverty because of my service to God.”

The Oracle making Socrates an idol focused undue attention on him and naturally many youth imitated, leaving him open to become a scapegoat for those jockeying for power in Athens. “Then too the young men follow after me—especially the ones with leisure, namely, the richest. They follow of their own initiative, rejoicing to hear men tested, and often they imitate me and undertake to test others; and next, I think, they find an ungrudging plenty of people who know little or nothing but think they have some knowledge. As a result, those whom they test become angry at me, not at themselves, and say that ‘this fellow Socrates is utterly polluted, and corrupts the youth.’ And when someone asks them what it is this Socrates does, what it is he teaches, they cannot say because they do not know; but so as not to seem at a loss, they mutter the kind of things that lie ready to hand against anyone who pursues wisdom: ‘things in the Heavens and beneath the Earth,’ or ‘not acknowledging gods,’ or ‘making the weaker argument stronger.'”

Because people do not want to be appear stupid, which endangers their position in society, they needed an outlet to return themselves back to comfort. “The truth, I suppose, they would not wish to state, namely, that it is become quite clear that they pretend to knowledge and know nothing. And because they are concerned for their pride, I think, and zealous, and numerous, and speak vehemently and persuasively about me, they have long filled your ears with zealous slander. It was on the strength of this that Meletus attacked me, along with Anytus and Lycon—Meletus angered on behalf of the poets, Anytus on behalf of the public craftsmen and the politicians, Lycon on behalf of the orators. So the result, as I said to begin with, is that I should be most surprised were I able to remove from you in this short time a slander which has grown so great.”

Falling neatly into René Girard’s view of envy, transference, and scapegoating, Socrates saw the entire city of Athens potentially allied against him. He asked his main accuser Meletus of who was a better role model than himself. Initially he said “the laws,” which was then clarified to be “the judges,” the audience, and “the Councilors too.” Soc: “So it seems that every Athenian makes them excellent except me, and I alone corrupt them. Is that what you are saying?” Mel: “That is exactly what I am saying.”

Girardian Primer:

Totem and Taboo – Sigmund Freud: https://rumble.com/v1gsmvn-totem-and-taboo-sigmund-freud.html

The Origin of Envy & Narcissism – René Girard: https://rumble.com/v1gsnwv-the-origin-of-envy-and-narcissism-ren-girard.html

Case Studies: Dora and Freud: https://rumble.com/v1gu2dt-case-studies-dora-and-freud.html

Stalking: World Narcissistic Abuse Awareness Day: https://rumble.com/v1gvhk1-stalking-world-narcissistic-abuse-awareness-day.html

Love – Freud and Beyond: https://rumble.com/v1gv5pd-love-freud-and-beyond.html

Psychoanalysis – Sigmund Freud and Beyond: https://rumble.com/v1gvgq7-psychoanalysis-sigmund-freud-and-beyond.html

Object Relations: Fear Of Success Pt. 2: https://rumble.com/v1gvuql-object-relations-fear-of-success-pt.-2.html

Object Relations: Fear Of Success Pt. 7: https://rumble.com/v3ub2sa-object-relations-fear-of-success-pt.-7.html

Object Relations: Melanie Klein Pt. 8: https://rumble.com/v50nczb-object-relations-melanie-klein-pt.-8.html

By going towards the definition of corruption, Socrates clarified why a distorted view of all against one was not plausible. He then attacked the contradiction in accusations from Meletus that Socrates was accused of creating new gods while at the same time being an atheist. Xenophon elaborated more on the subject in that following one’s conscience didn’t have to be mutually exclusive with a belief in gods. His criticisms of popular augury also exposed more hypocrisy amongst his critics. “One thing that I marvel at in Meletus, gentlemen, is what may be the basis of his assertion that I do not believe in the gods worshipped by the state; for all who have happened to be near at the time, as well as Meletus himself,—if he so desired,—have seen me sacrificing at the communal festivals and on the public altars. As for introducing ‘new divinities,’ how could I be guilty of that merely in asserting that a voice of God is made manifest to me indicating my duty? Surely those who take their omens from the cries of birds and the utterances of men form their judgments on ‘voices.’ Will any one dispute either that thunder utters its ‘voice,’ or that it is an omen of the greatest moment? Does not the very priestess who sits on the tripod at Delphi divulge the god’s will through a ‘voice’? But more than that, in regard to God’s foreknowledge of the future and his forewarning thereof to whomsoever he will, these are the same terms, I assert, that all men use, and this is their belief. The only difference between them and me is that whereas they call the sources of their forewarning ‘birds,’ ‘utterances,’ ‘chance meetings,’ ‘prophets,’ I call mine a ‘divine’ thing; and I think that in using such a term I am speaking with more truth and deeper religious feeling than do those who ascribe the gods’ power to birds. Now that I do not lie against God I have the following proof: I have revealed to many of my friends the counsels which God has given me, and in no instance has the event shown that I was mistaken.”

Regardless of his defense, he knew that the deep habit of prejudice was too strong. “Gentlemen of Athens, I do not think further defense is needed to show that, by the very terms of Meletus’ indictment, I am not guilty; this, surely, is sufficient. But as I said before, a great deal of enmity has risen against me among many people, and you may rest assured this is true. And that is what will convict me, if I am convicted—not Meletus, not Anytus, but the grudging slander of the multitude.”

Socrates was satisfied with the examined life and felt that the city was concerned with the wrong things. “Are you then not ashamed to care for the getting of money, and reputation, and public honor, while yet having no thought or concern for truth and understanding and the greatest possible excellence of your soul?” The soul for Socrates, which is to be just and to examine the truth of things is the inner wealth worth pursuing. “I go about doing nothing but persuading you, young and old, to care not for body or money in place of, or so much as, excellence of soul. I tell you that virtue does not come from money, but money and all other human goods both public and private from virtue. If in saying this I corrupt the youth, that would be harm indeed.”

By not taking a fee and not entering politics, Socrates was able to question anything. Once money gets to be involved too deeply beyond basic necessities, the true corruption sets in, where voices of craving blot out the voices of conscience. People have to defend the current order and refuse change due to their cravings and appetites. They ally with factions and political groups to protect their position and wealth in society which clouds the sense of justice they offer others and leaves them behind when they demand justice for themselves. “Perhaps it may seem peculiar that I go about in private advising men and busily inquiring, and yet do not enter your Assembly in public to advise the City. The reason is a thing you have heard me mention many times in many places, that something divine and godlike comes to me—which Meletus, indeed, mocked in his indictment. I have had it from childhood. It comes as a kind of voice, and when it comes, it always turns me away from what I am about to do, but never toward it. That is what opposed my entering political life, and I think it did well to oppose. For be well assured, Gentlemen of Athens, that had I attempted to enter political affairs, I should long since have been destroyed—to the benefit of neither you nor myself.”

As Socrates expected, he was condemned, but he was surprised that the vote was closer than he predicted. His one-on-one impact with Athenians, despite all the slander, was impressive. He wanted people to examine their conduct before engaging in exchanges with others, or to as least learn from ethical mistakes. “What do I deserve to pay or suffer because I did not through life keep quiet, and yet did not concern myself, as the multitude do, with money or property or military and public honors and other office, or the secret societies and political clubs which keep cropping up in the City, believing that I was really too reasonable and temperate a man to enter upon these things and survive? I did not go where I could benefit neither you nor myself; instead, I went to each of you in private, where I might perform the greatest service. I undertook to persuade each of you not to care for anything which belongs to you before first caring for yourselves, so as to be as good and wise as possible, nor to care for anything which belongs to the City before caring for the City itself, and so too with everything else in the same way…I say that the greatest good for man is to fashion arguments each day about virtue and the other things you hear me discussing when I examine myself and others, and that the unexamined life is not for man worth living.”

Most people, in the face of this injustice, would abandon the city so as to not waste precious time needed for escape, but virtue for Socrates was to accept the laws of one’s city with courage. “Neither in court of law nor in war ought I or any man contrive to escape death by any means possible. Often in battle it becomes clear that a man may escape death by throwing down his arms and turning in supplication to his pursuers; and there are many other devices for each of war’s dangers, so that one can avoid dying if he is bold enough to say and do anything whatever. It is not difficult to escape death, Gentlemen; it is more difficult to escape wickedness, for wickedness runs faster than death. And now I am old and slow, and I have been caught by the slower runner. But my accusers are clever and quick, and they have been caught by the faster runner, namely Evil. I now take my leave, sentenced by you to death; they depart, convicted by Truth for injustice and wickedness. I abide in my penalty, and they in theirs. That is no doubt as it should be, and I think it is fit.”

A life unexamined, full of heedless behavior, was a form of torture for Socrates, and so he felt that a shorter life while acting in virtue was better for posterity than living a long ignoble life. “I desire next to prophesy to you who condemned me. For I have now reached that point where men are especially prophetic—when they are about to die. I say to you who have decreed my death that to you there will come hard on my dying a punishment far more difficult to bear than the death you have visited upon me. You have done this thing in the belief that you would be released from submitting to examination of your lives. I say that it will turn out quite otherwise. Those who come to examine you will be more numerous, and I have up to now restrained them, though you perceived it not. They will be more harsh in as much as they are younger, and you shall be the more troubled. If you think by killing to hold back the reproach due you for not living rightly, you are profoundly mistaken. That release is neither possible nor honorable. The release which is both most honorable and most easy is not to cut down others, but to take proper care that you will be as good as possible. This I utter as prophecy to you who voted for my condemnation, and take my leave.”

The “Oracle,” or conscience, provided peace of mind for Socrates and was always a compass he tried to follow. “My accustomed oracle, which is divine, always came quite frequently before in every thing, opposing me even in trivial matters if I was about to err. And now a thing has fallen to my lot which you also see, a thing which some might think, and do in fact believe, to be ultimate among evils. But the Sign of the God did not oppose me early this morning when I left my house, or when I came up here to the courtroom, or at any point in my argument in anything I was about to say. And yet frequently in other arguments, it has checked me right in the middle of speaking; but today it has not opposed me in any way, in none of my deeds, in none of my words. What do I take to be the reason? I will tell you. Very likely what has fallen to me is good, and those among us who think that death is an evil are wrong. There has been convincing indication of this. For the accustomed Sign would surely have opposed me, if I were not in some way acting for good.”

The experience of death for Socrates was not so scary because he believed it was like a dreamless sleep, which ironically was cherished among the living. If there’s an afterlife, then the judges would be considered superior to any judges on earth. “There is not evil for a good man either in living or in dying, and the gods do not neglect his affairs.” He lastly wanted his method of examination to remain for his children. “When my sons are grown, Gentlemen, exact a penalty of them; give pain to them exactly as I gave pain to you, if it seems to you that they care more for wealth or anything else than they care for virtue. And if they seem to be something and are nothing, rebuke them as I rebuked you, because they do not care for what they ought, because they think themselves something and are worth nothing. And should you do that, both I and my sons will have been justly dealt with at your hands. But it is now the hour of parting—I to die and you to live. Which of us goes to the better is unclear to all but the God.”

Xenophon’s account tried to dispel critics of Socrates for his supposed lack of rigor in trying to defend himself. “…They have not shown clearly that he had now come to the conclusion that for him death was more to be desired than life; and hence his lofty utterance appears rather ill-considered.” This kind of worry and rumination leading to false defenses was something Socrates would have abhorred since sticking to the truth was more efficient and freeing. “Why, do I not seem to you to have spent my whole life in preparing to defend myself? All my life I have been guiltless of wrong-doing; and that I consider the finest preparation for a defence, and I have tried twice already to meditate on my defence, but my divine sign interposes.”

Extending life beyond what conscience allowed for Socrates was too much of a tainted experience. Most in the audience wanted to live as long a quantity of years as possible, but they ignored the quality of that life. “Do you think it surprising that even God holds it better for me to die now? Do you not know that I would refuse to concede that any man has lived a better life than I have up to now? For I have realized that my whole life has been spent in righteousness toward God and man,—a fact that affords the greatest satisfaction; and so I have felt a deep self-respect and have discovered that my associates hold corresponding sentiments toward me. But now, if my years are prolonged, I know that the frailties of old age will inevitably be realized,—that my vision must be less perfect and my hearing less keen, that I shall be slower to learn and more forgetful of what I have learned. If I perceive my decay and take to complaining, how could I any longer take pleasure in life? Perhaps God in his kindness is taking my part and securing me the opportunity of ending my life not only in season but also in the way that is easiest. For if I am condemned now, it will clearly be my privilege to suffer a death that is adjudged by those who have superintended this matter to be not only the easiest but also the least irksome to one’s friends and one that implants in them the deepest feeling of loss for the dead. For when a person leaves behind in the hearts of his companions no remembrance to cause a blush or a pang, but dissolution comes while he still possesses a sound body and a spirit capable of showing kindliness, how could such a one fail to be sorely missed? It was with good reason that the gods opposed my studying up my speech at the time when we held that by fair means or foul we must find some plea that would effect my acquittal. For if I had achieved this end, it is clear that instead of now passing out of life, I should merely have provided for dying in the throes of illness or vexed by old age, the sink into which all distresses flow, unrelieved by any joy. As Heaven is my witness, I shall never court that fate; but if I am going to offend the jury by declaring all the blessings that I feel gods and men have bestowed on me, as well as my personal opinion of myself, I shall prefer death to begging meanly for longer life and thus gaining a life far less worthy in exchange for death.”

Similar to Plato’s account of Socrates attacking the excessive love of money, the Xenophon interpretation focused more on the craving centered life. By influencing the youth to be stronger against temptation he was actually improving them in obvious ways, but more independent people can also be a threat to a state that is worried about maintaining their power and status quo. “First, who is there in your knowledge that is less a slave to his bodily appetites than I am? Who in the world more free,—for I accept neither gifts nor pay from any one? Whom would you with reason regard as more just than the one so reconciled to his present possessions as to want nothing beside that belongs to another? And would not a person with good reason call me a wise man, who from the time when I began to understand spoken words have never left off seeking after and learning every good thing that I could? Or for this, that while other men get their delicacies in the markets and pay a high price for them, I devise more pleasurable ones from the resources of my soul, with no expenditure of money? And now, if no one can convict me of misstatement in all that I have said of myself, do I not unquestionably merit praise from both gods and men? But in spite of all, Meletus, do you maintain that I corrupt the young by such practices? And yet surely we know what kinds of corruption affect the young; so you tell us whether you know of any one who under my influence has fallen from piety into impiety, or from sober into wanton conduct, or from moderation in living into extravagance, or from temperate drinking into sottishness, or from strenuousness into effeminacy, or has been overcome of any other base pleasure.”

By comparing his guilt to that of others, Socrates’ conscience was clear. “Well, gentlemen, those who instructed the witnesses that they must bear false witness against me, perjuring themselves to do so, and those who were won over to do this must feel in their hearts a guilty consciousness of great impiety and iniquity; but as for me, why should my spirit be any less exalted now than before my condemnation, since I have not been proved guilty of having done any of the acts mentioned in the indictment? For it has not been shown that I have sacrificed to new deities in the stead of Zeus and Hera and the gods of their company, or that I have invoked ill oaths or mentioned other gods. And how could I be corrupting the young by habituating them to fortitude and frugality? Now of all the acts for which the laws have prescribed the death-penalty—temple robbery, burglary, enslavement, treason to the state—not even my adversaries themselves charge me with having committed any of these…At one time I had a brief association with the son of Anytus, and I thought him not lacking in firmness of spirit; and so I predict that he will not continue in the servile occupation that his father has provided for him; but through want of a worthy adviser he will fall into some disgraceful propensity and will surely go far in the career of vice. The young man, delighting in wine, never left off drinking night or day, and at last turned out worth nothing to his city, his friends, or himself. So Anytus, even though dead, still enjoys an evil repute for his son’s mischievous education and for his own hard-heartedness.”

The Quest for Identity

By prizing, victory, glory, and honor, Socrates explained how those desires could conflict with virtue, which included justice. Most humans are desperate to find a place in society where they can receive positive emotions and a feeling of comfort away from threats to survival, which is the ultimate purpose of identity, but identities that ignore virtue make evil claims on society and support corrupt positioning and posturing. Endless competition leads people to cheat, to accumulate power, and stack the deck in favor of endless winning, with the rest of society endlessly losing. Reprisals and revenge cycles would be the response to achieve a modicum level of justice, leaving a society in chaos, because there’s little to no agreement on what is the correct level of contribution and reward for each person. There’s a need to compete when it comes to virtue, to be efficient and to conduct a society that works, but for those who lose in these situations again and again, meaning they have lost their positive identity, they are left out of higher levels of consumption, seethe with envy, are resentful of mistreatment, and demand a political solution. “In the Greek contest system, all men share, relative to their social position, the roles of subject and model, for all desire to possess all the goods of society for themselves, and anyone can be an object of envy. One aristocrat differs little from another, and they all desire the same things, the implements of honor and excellence. When one among them puts his personal worth together with an accomplishment, victory in the Olympic chariot races or prominent leadership in the assembly, for example, he stands as a model that attracts the envy of others. The others, subjects in Girard’s terminology, desire what he has gained and react as if suffering a diminution of their personal esteem and success. ‘The bitter competitiveness of the contest system,’ Alvin W. Gouldner continues, ‘induces men to relish openly the defeat of their foes—thereby making subsequent reconciliation all but impossible. On the other hand, envy from the side of the victorious savors the satisfaction of having gained all in the contest at others’ expense. The contest system, inspired by acquisitive desire, motivates the victor to continue winning and motivates the defeated to humiliate and impoverish him and take what he has from him—both motives for violence.”

Even Socrates couldn’t escape how the system was setup to coerce people into joining the chaos by choosing an identity in culture to mimic and rival for dominance. The cultural imitation becomes a “Being Disease,” or Ontological Sickness that one contracts. “Some Socratics showed their desire for the man by following him around the city. Some adopted his lifestyle. Aristophanes pointed out that the latter ‘were sick with Socrates,’ as if Socrates were a disease, or ‘desired to become Socrates.’ These Socratics actually copied him, wearing the same kind of clothes and mimicking his gait and manner of speech. Some like Apollodorus spent time with him daily, wanting ‘to know what he said or did.’ Others less ostentatious wrote accounts of Socrates beginning around the time of his death. (Even before then, if Diogenes Laertius may be trusted, Simon the cobbler wrote down what he could remember of the conversations Socrates had in his shop with his customers.) Aristotle called their writings Sókratikoi logoi and classified them as mimetic [imitative]. Evidently, he held that they represented Socrates’ words and deeds, although not necessarily for philosophical purposes. Xenophon’s Socrates, less philosophical than Plato’s, is a man of self-control and perhaps a more faithful copy of the original. Sókratikoi logoi in the form of narratives or dialogues circulated privately among what was a highly competitive circle of devotees. Little is known, of course, about their activities, but the titles that remain suggest a keen rivalry over representing Socrates…Indicative of their rivalry, however, is the absence of mention of Xenophon by Plato and Xenophon’s sole reference to Plato as Glaucon’s brother, as well as Xenophon’s shared titles, Apology of Socrates and Symposium—titles, Diskin Clay observes, ‘clearly meaning to rival the homonymous dialogues of Plato.’ The silence is compelling, especially beside the willingness of both to name others of Socrates’ companions and acquaintances.”

Competing for a cultural identity is to find your place in society. Unfortunately, you begin to hate the people you imitated because you want their position, and they are jealous because they still need the position and cannot give it up. In the modern world, it’s the way punditry platforms can become distorted by the need to make endless filler content to justify their existence. All media sources are controlled by a payroll, and in order to distinguish oneself from others it would be to try to disagree with rivals in as many areas as possible in order to win praise and wealth from subscriptions in society, yet being a contrarian may lead to more lies. Even historical interpretations can fall into this. Disagreements can happen because of the limited facts available about historical people, and so distortions can easily slip in. “Afterward, the rivalry of the Socratics was removed from them by his death. They could not enter into conflict with him, and so as model he could function positively for the individual. But external mediation easily slips, even in the case of a dead model, into ‘internal mediation.’ From imitating Socrates, which they definitely did, they could easily take that small step to the desire to imitate him more closely and in better fashion than the others and, finally, to acquire him in one’s version for one’s own.”

External mediation can continue with rivals trying to make a definitive account of the deceased, but the remaining guide is the internally introjected role model who is distorted into an ego-ideal where one’s copy is considered the most faithful copy of the dead model compared to others. The hope is that one can be treated as the curator of the position and gain the most social rewards. The competitors become very much the same as the role model in the same position they all want to occupy, but the rewards cannot be shared. If some look for more rewards than others, by charging fees, then others may enjoy the attention they get as compensation if they become more “authentic” by not charging fees, and especially if they are already wealthy and don’t need to. “In this way, the idea of Socrates mediates among Socratics internally—that is, within their circle—for it would be accessible to all, and all were disposed to acquire it exclusively of the others. The model is the written Socrates of the subjects. They imitate the Socrates of their desire, the one of their experience and imagination, in an effort to acquire him exclusively. By so doing, in time they defined an arena of topics within whose competition they were made alike. This accounts for the appearance of the same titles; each writer is trying to capture the definitive Socrates as his own.”

The Ego and the Id – Sigmund Freud: https://rumble.com/v1gvdo1-the-ego-and-the-id-sigmund-freud.html

You can easily extrapolate this to the modern world where the owner of capital hires a worker, demands certain standards, and when those are achieved, the rewards compete with virtue so that they can’t be enjoyed for too long before the employer keeps pressure for them to stay at their peak, even if close to burnout, and deal with jealous feelings when rivals are also hired for more pressure to squeeze as much out of them as possible. The rival eventually supersedes the idol, becomes disillusioned as they get treated exactly the same way. Of course, the best position is being the person with savings, or capital, who gets to make the decisions and is independent enough in wealth to make their life more comfortable. In Ancient Greece, as in any time, it’s all about finding places where consumption is comparatively free of stress.

In Plato’s case, he was critical of poets, but poetical influence over the public must have been something to envy. Subjects to rival over can be very different but the same in that one subject wants to take priority over another in their reflection of reality. “The young Plato evidently desired what poets enjoyed from time immemorial: authority as teacher and voice of wisdom. Then he encountered another voice, a voice capable of instructing the people in another way, and he went into another direction with his writing. But the desire to have what the poet has appears to have abided. He later engages himself in another mimetic rivalry, which he deemed an ‘ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry.'”

Even when Plato aimed at, either copying Socrates, or superimposing his own philosophy, to take his place, the method of Socratic dialogue could be blunted by mimetic rivalry, and make the search for truth appear like another thing to rival for. By denying knowledge, Socrates could put himself in the humble position of being the pupil, but it didn’t always succeed in the questioner looking humble to others in actuality. When his questions led to the model having to cave and accept an error in judgement, Socrates gained all the kudos in their eyes. They were humiliated. Socrates exposed again and again that the model interlocuter was just another person chasing culture. The goal was that by aiming at the truth, the rivalry would have no fuel to continue. Truth appears more and more objective when this method is taken seriously, and because objective truth becomes a common thing accessible to all, there’s still the human hunger that needs satisfaction. People needed to utilize what they thought was truth for sustenance and survival. In the Socratic lifestyle, by abandoning the need for conspicuous consumption and position, a clear conscience was much more possible to achieve than for those stuck in ambition, pride, envy, jealousy, resentment, contempt, as well as being mired in rumination and plans for revenge.

The difficulty is that this may not dawn on the interlocuter, and their hatred at being made stupid takes priority and constitutes a threat because they perceive that Socrates is looking for a winning position above them. The search for truth makes a detour into the feeling of not wanting to lose. This is partly why it’s better to assess a truth as to its threat to the listener before assuming that the advice will be welcomed. Advise often makes the listener feel compelled and they may perceive the suggestion as being laced with contempt and ridicule. Most people want the credit of finding wisdom, like in reading a book, but if they are told by the author directly, it may not sink as deeply. “The answerer becomes irritated by his failure to display his knowledge, but as long as the irony of Socrates’ ignorance holds, remains unaware of the contest and unprovoked by his inability to display his prowess. Whether Socrates actually knows is not the issue. Should his victims think that he is pretending not to know, then violence breaks out…Thrasymachus and Callicles penetrate Socrates’ pretense of ignorance and strategy of asking questions and not offering information. He lives in a child’s world without villains. He should come out and answer questions. These are victims who become, Robinson says, ‘angry with Socrates and ill-disposed towards him.’ Each believes that he knows the answer, asserts his claim to the object by fighting Socrates for it, and refuses to allow him the freedom from the fray. It is no accident that the [Socratic method] falters with these answerers, who in seeing through Socrates’ ‘accustomed irony’ become violent and lash out at him…More than the question, however, is at stake…Socrates examines how well and good the answerer has lived his life…For, once shown the flaws of his way of living, Socrates contends, the answerer will cease to be ignorant and change for the better. Many years of the [Socratic method], however, did not result in a community of enlightened citizens in pursuit of the best sort of life. Plato has Socrates admit in his Apology that many of them resent and hate him. Both effects, enlightenment and hatred, derive from Socrates’ activity. One is not the side effect of the other. Rather, they are conjoined, like cure and poison…”

Because the subjective hunger, craving, or appetite as Plato labeled it, always took precedence, unless one was a rare person who was independently wealthy, or an ascetic, “it seems clear that Socrates did not take money for his philosophic pursuits, though he may have accepted gifts of food and wine,” knowledge will usually be assessed as to it’s utility in preserving one’s position or advancing it. By renouncing excessive wealth, “Socrates appeals to the belief or hope that virtue will protect us against the wicked and take the sting out of death,” but “each [Socratic dialogue] causes a sacrificial crisis that envelops the individual in the loss of differences that imperils his identity and place in his city and the cosmos. The proliferation of such crises leads to realignment of the community against the one and the induction of the sacrificial mechanism, a ready expedient for a victimizing society and the fate of the Platonic Socrates.”

The awareness of this for most readers leads to a desire for non-rivalrous object choices. Many grinding ambitions become meaningless due to the fact that the pointless rivalry is about accumulating impermanent things, which many religions warn on deaf ears, and unless an object of desire is mass produced and available, there’s a risk of stepping into the bear trap once again. It is true that one cannot learn without culture and imitation, but the scarcity of positions in society that allow one to be spoiled and bored, motivating one to seek to consume at ever higher levels means that people have to do with less consumption if they want less rivalry.

Since everything is impermanent, all that one has left, ideally, is one’s good memories, and in comparison, memories of savoring with a clear conscience will appear more untainted, and now the mind in a counter-intuitive way is predisposed to enjoy those non-rivalrous memories much more, as they bubble up spontaneously to repeat activity in a more peaceful direction.

Object Relations: Fear Of Success Pt. 2: https://rumble.com/v1gvuql-object-relations-fear-of-success-pt.-2.html

What makes it most difficult to avoid being scapegoated is the independence that one maintains. In the world of ancient Athens, fear from oligarchs about democracy, and conversely the democratically inclined having fear of oligarchs, led to the need for people to take sides and join a faction. Being independent of all factions means whoever is currently in power, and who feels threatened, will behave with the understanding that those who are not for us must be against us. Even neutrality is viewed as dangerous because of it’s potential to turn into an enemy in the future. Those who want to preempt a loss will want to strike out first at all those who may in the future become a fifth column. When the entire society mechanically allies around a common enemy, their alliances and friendships renew institutions, and therefore each individual’s value and position in society. They become relieved from the fear of rejection, because alliances out of necessity prevent that from happening, but they are also relieved from threats of political reform. The celebration of a lamb sacrificed turns into a stew that can be shared by everyone included in an important alliance. Socrates was able to point out what Jesus Christ did in that by imitating a higher standard, one can avoid scapegoating others, even at the temporary expense of their position, and attain the psychological value of well-being and a clear conscience, and maybe a better judgment in the afterlife. Those who followed the scapegoating mechanism, were ultimately more interested in Machiavellian knowledge which is an exhausting rumination in the hopes to acquire enough consumption to numb the pain.

The Dialogues of Plato, Volume 1: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Gorgias, Menexenus (v. 1) – R. E. Allen: https://www.isbns.net/isbn/9780300044881/

Apology – Xenophon: https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0212

The Sacrifice of Socrates: Athens, Plato, Girard – Professor William Blake Tyrrell: https://www.isbns.net/isbn/9781611860542/